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CORPORATE FACTORY/SUPPLIER
MONITORING PROGRAMS AND THE
FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
REGULATING INDIAN FACTORY
CONDITIONS
Marc J. Monte*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, allegations of "sweatshop"1 conditions in
factories which produce garments for clothing and athletic
footwear lines endorsed by celebrities such as Kathy Lee
Gifford and Michael Jordan have called national attention to
the global issues of workers' rights, factory conditions and
child labor.2 In response to these revelations, the Union of
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees ("UNITE")'
and watchdog groups such as Sweatshop Watch,4 have cam-
paigned nationally to draw public awareness to these concerns
and have applied pressure to United States Federal5 and State
legislative bodies6 and the garment industry' to address these
conditions. These national campaigns spurred the recent deci-
sion of Guess, Inc. to pay a $1 million out of court settlement
of a 1996 lawsuit filed by garment workers who earned less
* The author will be receiving his J.D. from Brooklyn Law School in June,
2001. He would like to thank Professor Claire Kelly and Professor Samuel
Murumba for their insightful comments during the writing and publication process.
Additionally, he is grateful to his wife, Lauren, and his family, for their sup-
port-emotional, spiritual, and otherwise-throughout his education.
1. For purposes of this Note, a "sweatshop" is defined as "a business that
regularly violates both wage or child labor laws and safety or health regulations."
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., "SWEATSHOPS" IN NEW YORK CITY: A LOCAL EXAMPLE OF A
NATIONWIDE PROBLEM 1 (GAO/HRD-89-101BR, June 1989) [hereinafter GAO, NEW
YORK CITY].
2. See Steven Greenhouse, A Crusader Makes Celebrities Tremble: Image is
New Weapon in Sweatshop War, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996.
3. See Ron Blackwell, Globalization and the American Labor Movement, in
AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY, at 100 (1997).
4. See Sweatshop Watch - Sweatshop Accountability Campaign, at
http://Www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatcldindustry/cal'htm (last visited Sep. 18, 2000).
5. Robin Jaffin, Dignity on Saipan, MONITOR, Winter 1999, at 6.
6. See Sweatshop Watch, California's Bill to Stop Sweatshops, at
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/cal.htm (last visited Sep. 18, 2000).
7. See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 101.
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than the legal minimum wage8 and, more significantly,
prompted the decision by four major clothing retailers to settle
a class-action suit stemming from charges of abusive working
conditions (including involuntary servitude).' The settlement
resulted in the defendants paying $1.25 million for a moni-
toring program to ensure that these alleged abusive conditions
do not continue."
However, despite these victories against sweatshop opera-
tors and the western corporations that contract with them, the
problem of illegally operated garment factories persists
throughout the developing world, particularly in nations such
as India, that traditionally have inexpensive labor and produc-
tion costs. Highly progressive labor laws that have existed in
India since the earliest days of its independence from Great
Britain," have not prevented the on-going problems of wide-
spread bonded labor, 2 child labor 3 and violations of its re-
gional minimum wage laws 4 from continuing unabated. 5 In-
ternational responses to this problem, including efforts by the
International Labor Organization ("ILO") 6 to address the
8. See Nancy Cleeland, Guess to Pay Up to $1 Million to End Suit, LA
TIMES, July 21, 1999, at B2.
9. Doe I et al. v. The Gap, Inc. et al., C.D. Cal. No. CV-99-00329-CAS
(AJWx) (1999).
10. See id. See also Steven Greenhouse, 4 Companies Gain Accord in Labor
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999.
11. See, for example, the Factories Act of 1948, the Minimum Wages Act of
1948, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, and the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961,
collectively addressing all matters concerning the working conditions of garment
workers in India. See generally A. VINCENT ARPUTHOM, LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL
LAWS (1995).
12. Bonded labor is defined by the United States Department of State as "the
result of a private contractual relationship whereby a worker incurs or inherits a
debt to a contractor and then must work off the debt plus interest." U.S. Depart-
ment of State India Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 (1999),
at http:J/www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1998_hrpreport/india.html (last
visited January 31, 2001) [hereinafter "India Country Report"]. According to the
State Department, "[s]ome press reports indicate that Tamil Nadu [a state in In-
dia] alone has an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers." Id.
13. The United States State Department defines child labor as "[wlork by chil-
dren under 14." India Country Report, supra note 12. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) estimates that there are 44 million child laborers in India. Id.
14. Minimum wage laws in India are set by and enforced by the state govern-
ments. However, the "large number of industries [are] covered by a small cadre of
factory inspectors and their limited training and susceptibility to bribery result in
lax enforcement." India Country Report, supra note 12.
15. See id.
16. Declaration Concluding the Aims and Purposes of the ILO, adopted May
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plight of garment workers within nations, such as India, have
been rendered "marginal"17 and "in a slumbering condition""
by adherence to Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. 9
Article 2(7) emphasizes the sovereignty of individual states by
placing specifically domestic matters outside the jurisdiction of
the United Nations (hereinafter U.N.). 20
As the garment industry has undergone an aggressive
increase in international sourcing,21 the failure of individual
states and the international community to police working con-
ditions in these factories has become far more visible in west-
ern media. Reports of deplorable working conditions in gar-
ment factories have forced western clothing corporations that
contract with these factories, such as The Gap22 and Levi
Strauss & Company,' to protect their reputations from nega-
tive publicity and potential legal liability by instituting inde-
pendent factory monitoring programs and preparing codes of
conduct with which their licensees must comply.' For exam-
ple, clothing retailers such as The Gap have responded to pub-
lic interest group pressure by vowing to "recognize and accept
responsibility for the conditions under which their clothes are
produced.., translate and post the... code of conduct with
all of its offshore contractors [and] develop a system of inde-
pendent monitors to ensure that the terms of its code are en-
10, 1944, 3554, T.IA.S. No. 1868 at 80, 5 U.N.T.S. 104.
17. DAvID J. SAARI, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND SOVEREIGN NATIONS: COLLI-
SION OR COOPERATION? 154 (1999).
18. Id.
19. United Nations Charter, Article 2(7) reads "Nothing contained in the ...
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the ... Charter. . " U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
20. See id.
21. See Margaret A. Emmelhainz & Ronald J. Adams, The Apparel Industry
Response to 'Sweatshop' Concerns: A Review and Analysis of Codes of Conduct,
JOURNAL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, Summer, 1999. For the purposes of this
Note, "international sourcing" is defined as the production of apparel "by foreign
suppliers for U.S. manufacturers and retailers." Id.
22. See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 101.
23. See International Forum on Clean Clothes: Workers' and Consumers'
Rights in the Garment Industry, Brussels, April 30 - May 5, 1998, Case File: Levi
Strauss & Company Corporate Profile and Case Material, available at
httpJ/www.cleanclothes.org/companies/levi5-5-98.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
24. See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 101.
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forced."' Many industry players have adopted this approach
and successfully employed market forces to improve labor con-
ditions of factories in the developing world.26 This Note will
examine the failures of statutory approaches to the sweatshop
problem and the market mechanics behind the potential for
success in the garment industry's efforts to police itself. Addi-
tionally, this Note will propose a means of making the
industry's self-policing efforts more effective by introducing
monitoring programs that operate increasingly independent of
the licensing corporations. Finally, this Note will recommend
improvements in the application of independent monitoring
programs that will make the reporting system more reliable
and encourage more western companies to use them without
fear of "ideological blackmail."27
II. THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN INDIA
A. India's Progressive Legal Framework to Protect Workers'
Rights.
India's regulation of its garment manufacturing industry
centers around the Factories Act of 1948. The Act's main
objectives are to:
(a) protect the interests of workmen;
(b) ensure better conditions of work to the workmen;
(c) prevent employers from taking advantage of the weaker
bargaining powers of the workmen;
(d) regulate conditions of employment of young persons and
females;
(e) provide for safe and healthy working conditions inside the
factories;
(f) require the employer to take certain minimum steps for
the welfare of the workers;
(g) bring about uniformity in the number of working hours
and leave with wages; and,
25. Id.
26. See Emmelhainz & Adams, supra note 21.
27. The lack of competing monitoring programs can lead to the imposition of
demands on western companies that exceed those of workers' rights groups, and
reflect specific cultural biases that may exceed the scope of the monitoring
programs' contracted tasks. See discussion infra Section IV.
28. Act 63 of 1948, Factories Act, 1948.
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(h) provide for licensing, registration and inspection of facto-
ries.2
Among the specific issues addressed by The Factories Act
are cleanliness of the factory," ventilation in the work
space," overcrowding,12 availability of clean drinking water
to the workers," and specifications for clean, accessible toilet
facilities.34 Additionally, The Factories Act sets the maximum
number of working hours at nine hours per d~y35 and 48
hours per week," which may be exceeded only with "the Chief
Inspector's previous approval."3 7 The Factories Act also "total-
ly prohibits the employment of children below 14 years"" and
states that women shall be employed only between 6 a.m. and
7 p.m.39 Among the more progressive grants by The Factories
Act to the workers are mandatory first aid facilities, 40 provi-
sion of canteens in factories employing 250 or more workers,
41
and creches in factories employing 30 or more women.42
Revising The Factories Act by addressing several issues,
such as minimum wage schedules for different industrial job
categories and overtime compensation, The Minimum Wages
Act of 1948,4' and its subsequent revisions in 1950,"
1953, 45 and 1963,46 provides detailed guidelines for minimum
wage rates for workers in every industry in India,47 as well as
a means for discovering for violations of the minimum wage
29. Id. § 1.
30. Id. § 11.
31. Id. § 13.
32. Id. § 16.
33. Id. § 18.
34. Act 63 of 1948, Factories Act, 1948, § 19.
35. Id. § 54.
36. Id. § 51.
37. Id. § 54.
38. Id. § 71.
39. Id. § 58.
40. Act 63 of 1948, Factories Act, 1948, § 45.
41. Id. § 46.
42. Id. § 48. A "crbche' is defined by the Factories Act as "a suitable room or
rooms for [workers'] children who are under the age of 6 years." Id.
43. Act 11 of 1948, Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
44. Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950.
45. Minimum Wages (Tamil Nadu) Rules, 1953.
46. Minimum Wages (Undisbursed) Amounts (Tamil Nadu) Rules, 1963.
47. See Minimum Wages Act, 1948, § 3.
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laws.48 The Minimum Wages Act, in addition to creating a
Central Advisory Board to administer the law, " assigns spe-
cific penalties for certain. offenses, including monetary fines
and imprisonment.0
Another legislative act that is intended to protect workers
is the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,"' whose goal is "to pro-
vide machinery for a just and equitable settlement of industri-
al disputes by negotiation and conciliation and thereby achieve
industrial peace and economic justice."52 One of the Act's spe-
cific aims was "to provide job security to workers in industrial
establishments."53 The Industrial Disputes Act defines "indus-
try" for the purpose of its application54 and administers specif-
ic guidelines for lock-outs,55 strikes," and sets requirements
for compensation to workers who have been "retrenched.""
Additionally, the Act sets penalties for illegal strikes and lock-
outs58 and provides for boards of conciliation, 9 courts of en-
quiry,60 and Industrial Tribunals6' to review and resolve all
48. See id. § 19.
49. See id. § 8.
50. See id. § 22.
51. Act 14 of 1947, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
52. Id. § 1.
53. Id. § 1.
54. Id. § 2(j). Defines "industry" as "any business, trade, undertaking, manu-
facture or calling of employees and includes any calling service, employment, hand-
icraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." Id.
55. Id. § 2(1). Defines "lock-outs" as the "temporary closing of a place of em-
ployment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to
employ any number of persons employed by him." Id.
56. Id. § 2(q). Defines "strikes" as the "cessation of work by employees of an
industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal to work or accept employ-
ment with a common understanding among the employees." Id.
57. Act 14 of 1947, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, § 2(00). Defines "retrench-
ment" as the "termination of the service of a workman by the employer for any
reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary
action (i.e. termination of service as a punishment in a disciplinary is not re-
trenchment)." Id.
58. Id. § 26.
59. Id. § 5. This section empowers "the appropriate government to constitute
boards of conciliation to promote settlement of industrial disputes. The board shall
consist of one chairman and 2 or 4 members. The chairman shall be an indepen-
dent person and the members shall be appointed in equal numbers to represent
the parties in dispute (employer and employees)." Id.
60. Id. § 6. This section empowers "the appropriate government to constitute a
court of enquiry, when occasion arises for that, for enquiring into any matter con-
nected with, or relevant to an industrial dispute. The court may consist of one
independent person or such more persons as the appropriate government may
1130
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industrial labor disputes.
Finally, the Maternity Benefit Act of 19612 addresses the
role of women in the industrial sector, establishing a benefit of
pregnant workers' average daily wages during their absence
six weeks before and six weeks after giving birth or miscarry-
ing, 3 and protects them from dismissal during their materni-
ty period." Additionally, the Act provides a medical stipend
from her employer if that employer has not otherwise provided
for her medical care.65 After returning to the job, the worker
is permitted two daily breaks to nurse her child until that
child reaches 15 months.6
B. Obstacles to Enforcement: The Harsh Realities of India's
Labor Conditions.
The breadth of these legislative acts suggests that India is
a nation where the rights of industrial workers are closely
guarded by the government. However, the reality of Indian
labor conditions reveals something quite different. In 1997, a
survey ordered by the Indian Supreme Court of child labor
throughout the country was completed and documented the
existence of nearly "150,000 wage-earning child laborers."7
An non-governmental organization ("NGO") survey conducted
in 1997 reported that as many as "111 million children (almost
one in every three) [were] involved in some form of child labor
that accounts for 20% of India's Gross National Product.
6 8
thinks [sic] fit . . . The court will enquire into the matters referred to it and
ordinarily submit its report within 6 months. The report shall be in writing and
signed by all the members. Its report is recommendatory in nature. It has no
power to pass any award. It cannot enquire into any matter which is not referred
to it." Id.
61. Id. § 7(a). This section empowers "the appropriate government to consti-
tute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes
relating to any matter specified in the second schedule, or the third schedule, or
to perform such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act ...
An Industrial Tribunal . .. is only an ad-hoc body, i.e. it is constituted only for a
particular case and is not a permanent tribunal."
62. Act 53 of 1961, The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
63. See id. § 4.
64. See id. § 4.
65. See id. § 26.
66. Id. § 6.
67. India Country Report, supra note 12.
68. Child Labor and Education in India, at http'//eric.tcs.tulane.edu/-afeinst
labor.html (last visited Nov. 15, 1999). The difference in numbers reported by this
2001] 1131
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Labor policy analysts working in India estimate that there are
currently about 70,000 child laborers in the garment industry
alone.69 The ILO estimates that there are approximately 44
million child laborers in India." A confederation of unions in
124 countries has reported that "there were an estimated 55
million child workers in India despite legislation to outlaw the
practice."7' Between the enactment of the Bonded Labor (Reg-
ulation and Abolition) Act in 1979 and March 31, 1993,
251,424 bonded workers were released from their obligations,
with some states claiming that in excess of 25,000 such labor-
ers currently remain in bond. 2 In total, the United States
Department of State estimates that over 90 percent of the
Indian workforce, for various reasons, are not subject to the
highly progressive Indian labor laws typified by The Factories
Act, 1948,"3 leaving the fate of the vast majority of Indian
workers in the hands of non-governmental entities.74
Several systemic obstacles arise when addressing the prob-
lems of child and bonded labor (as well as recurring violations
of Indian labor condition laws) through domestic Indian legis-
lation and enforcement thereof. For example, "the continuing
prevalence of [Indian child labor] may be attributed to social
acceptance of the practice and to the failure of state and feder-
al governments to make primary school compulsory."" The
fact that Indian "[p]rimary school education is not compulsory,
free, and universal"76 leaves children vulnerable as those
survey and the one noted above at note 67 is attributable to the inclusion of child
agricultural laborers, who account for 86% of the total number reported and are
omitted from the India Country Report as agricultural workers are the most diffi-
cult to maintain accurate records of. Id. See India Country Report, supra note 12.
69. Josephine Bow, Asia's Fertile Fields (Labor Conditions in the Garment
Industry), WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, May 1, 1996, at 8.
70. India Country Report, supra note 12.
71. Clare Nullis, Labor Boycott to Target Products Made By Children, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, June 15, 1994, at 41.
72. India Country Report, supra note 12.
73. Id.
74. A stark example of the inapplicability of sweeping Indian legislative acts
in this sphere is offered by the 1986 Child Labour Act, which was "designed to
target children in hazardous industries" and is "so narrowly focused that it ex-
cludes more children than it includes. Fully 92 percent of all working children in
India are not covered by the Act." See Tackling Abuses: Indian Government Action
on Child Labour, MNC Masala, Corporate Watch Features, at http:J/mnc-
masala.corpwatch.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
75. India Country Report, supra note 12.
76. Id.
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"sent from their homes to work because their parents cannot
afford to feed them, or in order to pay off a debt incurred by a
parent or relative, have little choice in the matter."7 In 1997,
MNC Masala s noted that "[tihe problem of educational depri-
vation in India is critical."79 It is almost certain that India
has entered the 21st century with nearly half its population
(and more than 60 percent of its women) illiterate." In 1995,
an estimated 78 million primary school age children in India
(between six and 11 years) were not in school.8' There is cur-
rently no general law governing compulsory education in India
and in the one state (Tamil Nadu) that has passed such a law,
it has yet to be implemented.82 Additionally, parents who may
wish to seek out an education for their children may be dis-
couraged by the widespread employment of sub-standard edu-
cators in India.' But generally, this concern seems to be over-
shadowed by that of income poverty. According to a press re-
port in June, 1998, "parents in Orissa allegedly are selling
their children to contractors for $20 to $38."" Government
officials claim that nothing can be done in such cases as the
children are going "with their parents' consent." 5 In short,
one significant failing of the system is society's acceptance of
child labor.8" India's acceptance drives the market's demand
for child labor as "employers prefer child labour because it is
77. Id.
78. MNC Masala is a non-governmental organization that studies the effects of
globalization on India's economy and workforce. The group issues reports of its
findings and advocates specific measures to combat the negative impact of global-
ization. See MNC Masala, Corporate Watch, at http'/www.igc.apc.org/trac/feature/
india/index.html (last visited June 1, 2000).
79. Persistent Deprivation, MNC Masala, Corporate Watch Features, at
http://mncmasala.corpwatch.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
80. Id. Accurate statistics regarding illiteracy in India on January 1, 2001
have not yet been compiled.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. MNC Masala reported that in 1997, 4 out of every 5 primary school
teachers in India have failed a Standard 5 Test, and 2 out of every 3 primary
school teachers in India could not give a correct title to a paragraph. See Human
Index, MNC Masala, Corporate Watch Features, at http://www.igc.apc.orgtrac
feature/indialstats/humanl.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
84. India Country Report, supra note 12. Orissa is a coastal state in India
that borders on the Bay of Bengal and includes the port cities of Bhitar Kanika
and Pur.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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cheaper than adult labour and because children, unlike adults,
cannot question the treatment meted out to them."87 Addition-
ally, "[e]vidence indicates that the child's wage.., is a third to
a half that of adults for the same output, with the child work-
ing for as many, if not more, hours than the adults."'
Exceptionally lax enforcement methods pose another sig-
nificant impediment to preventing the spread of sweatshop
operations. 9 It is conceded that "[a]lthough occupational safe-
ty and health measures vary widely, in general, neither state
nor central Government resources for inspection and enforce-
ment of standards are adequate."90 According to an employee
at the Punjab Labour Department, "[w]e have very good labour
laws but the implementation is lacking because of a lack of
political will at state level."9' An officer for an NGO operating
in Punjab noted that "[there is very little faith left in the
Labour Department among the workers."92 Perhaps most sig-
nificantly, an officer at the Indian Human Rights Commission
stated that "[w]e should promote the involvement of sincere
and dependable NGO groups because where there are govern-
ment inspectors there is corruption."93 In the absence of con-
sistent government monitoring of garment factories for compli-
ance with Indian law, factory owners and managers are effec-
tively left with the power to further cut their production and
labor costs by ignoring legal requirements such as minimum
wages, overtime compensation and creches.94
III. GLOBAL APPROACHES
In the face of individual states' failure to effectively ad-
dress the issue of oppressive factory working conditions, the
international community has responded with global regimes
aimed at stamping out the elements of sweatshop opera-
tions.95 These efforts, however, have met with no more suc-
87. Tackling Abuses, supra note 74.
88. Id.
89. See India Country Report, supra note 12.
90. Id. See also note 14.
91. Tackling Abuses, supra note 74.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See India Country Report, supra note 12.
95. See SAARI, supra note 17, at 154.
1134 [Vol. XMV:3
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cess than the aforementioned Indian domestic measures."
First, it is necessary to identify the relevant efforts of the in-
ternational community to address the sweatshop issue. Second,
it is pertinent to examine the factors that have caused these
efforts to fail. Finally, the note will discuss how individual
corporate monitoring programs have successfully addressed the
problems of sweatshop operations using the case specific ap-
proach.
To address the specific issue of child labor, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child97 "explicitly
recognized the right of the child to be protected from economic
exploitation""8 in Article 32 of the Convention.9 Such exploi-
tation included "work that interferes with a child's education
[and work that is] harmful to a child's health or physical, men-
tal, spiritual, moral, or social development." 0 Similarly, the
ILO has promoted the creation of "international labor stan-
dards" deliberating over "those standards which will become
international labor Conventions or Recommendations."1 1 The
ILO created a framework that permits member nations to file
complaints against other member nations alleging non-compli-
ance with the ILO's labor standards and allows the ILO's gov-
erning body to review them.0 2 The ILO claims that its stan-
dard-setting function draws its effectiveness "from the constant
search for consensus between public authorities and the princi-
pal interested parties, namely employers and workers."0 3
The ILO ultimately encounters the same problem of na-
tional sovereignty that the United Nations faces in attempting
to enforce its decisions and standards, even on member na-
tions. ' 4 Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter specifical-
96. See discussion infra Part II.B.
97. GA Res. 44/25, November 20, 1989, entered into force September 2, 1990.
98. SAARI, supra note 17, at 154.
99. GA Res. 44/25, supra note 97, art. 32.
100. SAARI, supra note 17, at 154.
101. International Labour Organization: International Labour Standards and
Human Rights, at http'//www.ilo.org/publc/english/50normes/standard.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 1998).
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. For the purpose of this
Note, national sovereignty, as a factor preventing U.N. members from enforcing
resolutions concerning labor condition standards, is characterized by the language
of Article 2(7), which reads:
2001] 1135
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ly states that matters "within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state" do not fall within the United Nations' enforcement juris-
diction."0 5 A nation's regulation of its industrial labor force
and garment factories clearly falls within the boundaries of
domestic regulation. Although the United Nations, through
several conventions and declarations has gradually moved
towards a qualified view of national sovereignty,"6 these ac-
tions specifically addressed issues such as "the rights of wom-
en, children, refugees, migrant workers, stateless persons,
minorities, prohibition of torture, racial or religious discrimina-
tion, right to development and peace, etc."0 7 As a result, the
international community seems reluctant to undermine nation-
al sovereignty in addressing the sweatshop issue. Although
there appears to be a move towards humanitarian interven-
tionism, as evidenced by NATO's operations in Kosovo in 1999,
Article 2(7) still governs international conduct regarding hu-
man rights and sovereignty.0 8
Another problem that plagues the ILO is what Henry
Kissinger referred to as an "appallingly selective concern in the
applications of the ILO's basic conventions on freedom of asso-
ciation and forced labor,"' 9 which Mr. Kissinger argues
"strengthens the proposition that these human rights are...
subject to different interpretations for states with different
political systems.""' Combined with the fact that not all
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the Unit-
ed Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chap-
ter VII.
Id.
105. Id.
106. The United Nations' protracted handling of South Africa's policy of Apart-
heid is perhaps the most striking example of the international community's slow
progress towards embracing proactive measures in response to traditionally domes-
tic issues. For an effective analysis of this process, see Louis Sohn, Interpreting
The Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 169, 211 (Oscar Schachter & Christo-
pher Joyner, eds., 1995).
107. Abdulrahim P. Vijapur, No Distant Millennium: The UN Human Rights
Instruments and the Problem of Domestic Jurisdiction, 35 INDIAN J. INTL L. 51, 57
(1995).
108. See UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, supra note 104, at art. 2(7).
109. Walter Galenson, U.N. Studies: The International Labor Organization:
Mirroring the U.N.'s Problems, 7.
110. Id.
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member states ratify each treaty, this selectivity in addressing
these violations is particularly troubling in that failure to rati-
fy does not insulate a nation from complaints filed by other
states regarding freedom of association."' India has not rati-
fied ILO conventions created in 1937, 1957, and 1973 regard-
ing forced labor and minimum age standards for industry."'
However, another ILO member state could, under the frame-
work created for addressing member states' non-compliance
with ILO standards, bring an action against India for violating
the terms of one of these conventions. Consequently, the ab-
sence of universally accepted standards as manifested in a
series of universally ratified conventions, and in tandem with a
universally enforced standard, renders the enforceability of
global labor standards aspirational at best. The addition of
asserted sovereignty into this equation makes a given nation's
cooperation vital and renders the independence of the system
null and void. To effectively address the sweatshop issue, the
industry players have to take the initiative, as they are the
ones providing the incentive for the lowest possible costs of
production and thus, creating the conditions for sweatshops to
thrive."1
IV. THE MARKET-BASED SOLUTION
The aforementioned failures of domestic and international
legal measures to effectively police illegal sweatshops has
largely left the issue in the hands of the corporations whose
licensing agreements fuel the system."' "Today the emerging
issue is how do you hold private companies accountable for the
treatment of their workers at a time when government control
is ebbing all over the world."" 5 The impetus for self-policing
by designers and retailers has primarily to do with preserving
111. See id.
112. See International Standards Department, ILO/Geneva, at
http://www.ilo.org/public/englishl50normes/standard/htm (last visited Feb. 6, 1998).
113. See Andrew Ross, Introduction to No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND
THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 25 (1997).
114. See id. at 23.
115. Thomas L. Friedman, The New Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1999,
at 19.
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their self-image in an industry driven by image.' One com-
mentator said:
Media interest has been kindled by the spectacle of blue-
chip names in retail and design being embarrassed by revela-
tions about the exploited labor behind their labels. In the
wake of the publicity scandals, some companies have been
pressured to implement codes of conduct and to consider
facilitating independent monitoring of labor conditions in
their contractors' plants."117
The United States is currently the world's largest importer
of garments, importing them from over 150 different countries,
many of which are considered "underdeveloped.""' Many gar-
ments are manufactured through licensing agreements with
major American retailers and designers and are produced in
factories throughout the developing world." 9 In recent years,
the media and workers' rights advocates have held these
licensors publicly responsible for the adverse working condi-
tions that have been discovered in many of the factories where
their garments are made. The failure of local authorities in the
manufacturers' nation to police factory conditions through
enforcement of local and national laws has left the American
corporations vulnerable to charges of complicity in the perpetu-
ation of these conditions.' In response to this, some gar-
ment companies have adopted corporate codes of conduct and
instituted independent monitoring programs to supervise the
conduct of their suppliers' factories. Codes of conduct are for-
mal policies which purport to shape corporate conduct in cer-
tain ways."' Most corporate codes of conduct address the
classic sweatshop issues, such as child and involuntary labor,
discrimination, coercion and harassment, health and safety,
and compensation. 22' The code, once prepared, is translated
116. See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 102.
117. Ross, supra note 113, at 31.
118. Emmelhainz & Adams, supra note 21.
119. See id.
120. See Alan Rolnick, The Saipan Saga: Why It Could Have Far-Reaching
Impact, BOBBIN, June 1, 1999, at 65.
121. See Jill Murray, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards, Inter-
national Labor Organization: Bureau For Workers Activities, at http://www.ilo.org/
publicdenglish/230actrapubl/codes.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 1998).
122. See Alan Rolnick, Muzzling the Offshore Watchdogs, BOBBIN, Feb. 1, 1997,
at 72.
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into the languages" spoken in the offshore contractor's facto-
ry and posted where all of the workers can view it." The
code of conduct serves to clearly state the licensor's conditions
for doing business with that specific licensee and promotes the
licensee's compliance through incessant threat to terminate the
licensing agreement, often stated in the code or in ancillary
contracts which formalize the licensing relationship."
To ensure that licensees are complying with these codes,
licensors often use independent supplier monitoring programs,
in which factory condition auditors are sent to specific factories
by the licensor to report on its present conditions, ensuring
that the licensee is complying with the licensor's code of con-
duct and all applicable local laws.126 As the western firms
may be held accountable for any abuses occurring in their
suppliers' factories (by informed consumers through the poten-
tial loss of sales due to the negative publicity caused by disclo-
sures of these abuses), knowledge of these abuses gives the
licensors the choice of taking immediate and definitive correc-
tive action, such as terminating the suppliers' contracts. 2 '
One such program, the "Global Sourcing and Operating Guide-
lines" program, 8 implemented in 1992 by Levi Strauss &
Company was examined as a model supplier monitoring pro-
gram by an International Forum on labor conditions in gar-
ment industry factories held in Belgium in 1998."
The Forum used the Levi Strauss program as a model
specifically because it was one of the earliest programs of its
kind.30 Although criticizing Levi Strauss' deference to local
minimum wage laws, rather than insisting on a "living
123. Many factories in relatively prosperous nations such as Taiwan and Hong
Kong (with smaller number of native industrial-level workers) use recruiting agen-
cies to hire workers from other, poorer nations. As a result, many of these facto-
ries employ significant numbers of workers, speaking numerous languages, who
may not comprehend code of conduct posters in only the native language of the
factory's location.
124. See Rolnick, supra note 122, at 72.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Body of Knowledge, PR Central, Levi's Responsible Sourcing Guide-
lines, at httpJ/www.prcentral.com/c95levi.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
128. International Forum, supra note 23.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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wage,"'' the Forum generally praised Levi Strauss for its
effort to "establish norms of behavior for multinationals which
seek to follow ethical standards, legal requirements, environ-
mental requirements, employment standards and certain levels
of community involvement. " 132 However, the most important
finding of the Forum in examining the Levi Strauss program
was the intrinsic value of an independent monitoring program,
in contrast to a company-administered one. In spite of the
contention of Levi's executives, who thought that Levi Strauss
personnel were best suited to inspect suppliers' factories, the
Forum concluded, based upon information gathered in Levi
Strauss' Asian supplier factories, that workers in those facto-
ries naturally associate Levi's representatives with their own
bosses, "whom they fear." 33 The inherent trust they would
give independent monitoring teams would result in more accu-
rate audits of the factory conditions and would allow Levi
Strauss to take any action necessary upon an accurate account-
ing of those conditions. 34 Based upon a precise accounting,
the company is able to communicate its requirements for
change to the factory to pressure the factory into compliance
with local law.'35 Other companies, such as The Gap, have
been lauded for their use of independent monitoring programs
rather than relying on company-employed auditors.'36
The success of independent monitoring programs in gar-
nering positive media attention 3 ' such as that employed by
The Gap has prompted garment industry companies to join
forces to promote a uniform, industry-wide code of conduct and
principles of monitoring. 31 Perhaps the clearest evidence of
the industry's trust in codes of conduct and factory monitoring
programs is the central role they played in the recent settle-
ment of the class action suit stemming from allegations of
corporate complicity in alleged labor abuses in the Northern
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See International Forum, supra note 23.
135. See id.
136. See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 101.
137. See id.
138. See Preliminary Agreement Charter Document Fair Labor Association,
Prepared by Apparel Industry Partnership, at http'//www.lchr.org/sweatshop/
aipfull.htm (last visited Sep. 18, 1999).
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Marianas."9 The suit, which alleged that the defendant firms
had participated in a "racketeering conspiracy,"14 ° uncovered
extensive violations of labor law in the factories and workers'
quarters.1 4 ' These findings were widely reported by the
media 4 2 and the resulting negative publicity convinced the
defendants to settle rather than defend themselves in pro-
longed litigation. In the settlement, an independent factory
auditing firm was designated to make unannounced visits to
observe factories in their ordinary operations in the Northern
Marianas.' This suit raised the issue of factory conditions in
a setting where local law does little to mitigate sweatshop
working conditions. 5 and resolved in a settlement to insti-
tute a privately administered, independent monitoring pro-
gram.4 6 Although the suit may have heightened legislative
awareness of the sweatshop issue in the United States, 47 the
significant fact is that the industry regulated itself in the ab-
sence of any truly effective legal framework. The success of
internal corporate regulation is important when predicting the
success of private factory monitoring in a country such as In-
dia, where laws have consistently failed to correct sweatshop
factory conditions. Furthermore, the faith that NGOs have
placed in independent monitoring programs outside the gar-
ment industry provides an important insight to the value of
such programs in India.
139. See Robert Collier, Apparel Firms Settle Suit on Sweatshops: A First Step
To Correct Labor Abuse On Saipan, SAN FRANCIScO CHRONICLE, Aug. 10, 1999.
140. U.S. Firms Face 'Racketeering' Charges, BBC News - BBC Online Network,
at http'//news.bbc.co.uk/hienglish/world/americasnewsid_254000/254854.stm (last
visited May 26, 2000).
141. See Beneath the American Flag: Labor and Human Rights Abuses in the
CNMI, at http://www.house.gov/resources/l05cong/democrat/cnmifin.html (last visited
May 26, 2000).
142. See Is This The USA? Behind the Trusted 'Made in the USA Label -
ABCNews.com OnAir, Transcript, at http://www.mach3ww.com/trsl3/public_html/
2020.html (last visited Sep. 18, 1999).
143. See Collier, supra note 139.
144. Doe I et al. v. The Gap, Inc. et al., C.D. Cal. No. CV-99-00329-CAS
(AJWx) (1999).
145. See Beneath the American Flag, supra note 141.
146. See Doe I et al. v. The Gap, Inc. et al., C.D. Cal. No. CV-99-00329-CAS
(AJWx) (1999).
147. See California's Bill to Stop Sweatshops, supra note 6.
148. See Almost Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Independent
Monitoring, Clean Clothes Campaign, at http'//www.cleanclothes.org/codes/monitor-
ing-long.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
149. See THE ENRON CORPORATION: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
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Private measures taken by the western licensors are not
subject to the issues of societal acceptance of sweatshop condi-
tions,"s nor to the failure of legal enforcement instruments to
carry out meaningful enforcement of Indian labor law.1"' Fac-
tory licensees in India are given a set of conditions with which
they must comply to enjoy the benefits of a licensing agree-
ment with a well-known western corporation." 2 Furthermore,
these conditions are prominently posted in the factory so that
workers are aware of their rights.'53 The workers are also
aware that the licensor has made the factory owners' obser-
vance of the workers' rights a condition of pursuing business
under the license, so that interviews by factory auditors with
workers may elicit pointed responses identifying abuses that
have been hidden by the factory's management.'54 Therefore,
the on-going threat of unannounced visits by monitoring teams
provides the motivation for the factory owners to ensure that
the code of conduct is being followed, simply as a price of doing
a lucrative business with the licensor. These pressures work
independently of the legal system, so that the weaknesses in
the legal structures which address labor issues (such as cor-
rupt inspectors or insufficient funds to carry out effective state-
ordered factory inspections)... will not be reflected in the atti-
tude of factory managers towards working conditions and the
necessary correction will take place.
VIOLATIONS 5 (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In response to large-scale demonstra-
tions over the business practices of a major Western energy company in the Indi-
an state of Maharashtra, local police carried out mass arrests and beatings of the
organizers and protestors. The corporation's role in co-opting the local authorities
to suppress dissent against the company's operations led Human Rights Watch, a
prominent NGO, to issue a list of recommended courses of action to the Indian
government as well as to Enron. Among the recommendations to Enron was the
request to "[aillow independent verification, by national and/or international NGO's,
of compliance by the company with international, national, and state-level human
rights and environmental standards. Id.
150. See India Country Report, supra note 12.
151. See discussion infra Part II.B.
152. See Emmelhainz & Adams, supra note 21.
153. See Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards - International
Labour Organization Bureau for Workers' Activities, at http://www.ilo.org/publict
englishldialogue/actrav/publ/codes.htm (last visited June 1, 2000).
154. See id.
155. See discussion infra Part II.B
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The real and perceived independence of the monitoring
systems themselves will ultimately decide if lasting change can
be achieved, or if these programs will simply evolve into a
means of controlling negative publicity for western licensors
without producing any significant improvement. Many of the
programs currently in use are administered directly by the
licensors or their legal representatives'56 and may lend them-
selves to charges of superficiality by critics.' 7 The significant
result of the Saipan litigation 58 is the enforcement of a moni-
toring program that is completely independent of the licensors
or the factory owners involved in the suit.'59 The program
will include "unannounced factory visits and investigation of
complaints by workers" 6 and will be administered by a non-
profit monitoring firm rather than quality assurance divisions
of the licensors. 6' This move towards monitoring programs
that are not answerable to licensors or factory owners has been
described as "a good faith effort to further [licensors'] commit-
ment to using vendors who comply with the law."'62 However,
to ensure that the potentially suspect agenda of the licensors is
not simply replaced by the specific agenda of a single monitor-
ing firm, '6 competition within the monitoring field may be
necessary to preserve objectivity.
156. See Almost Everything, supra note 148.
157. See What's Fair about the Fair Labor Association?, Global Economy, at
http//www.globalexchange.orgeconomy/corporations/sweatshops/fla.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2000).
158. See Doe I et al. v. The Gap, Inc. et al., C.D. Cal. No. CV-99-00329-CAS
(AJWx) (1999).
159. See Steven Greenhouse, supra note 10.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. In an editorial in her firm's magazine intended to define independent
monitoring, Veritd's founder, Heather White, focused exclusively on monitoring
programs in China. In the article, she makes sweeping claims such as "China
poses the biggest monitoring challenges," and "[mianaging monitoring programs in
China using the Verit6 model of worker interviews is complex because the gov-
ernment is opposed to human rights work conducted within its borders." See
Heather White, Defining Independent Monitoring, MONITOR, Winter 1999, Issue 2,
at 3. White's focus on political matters rather than specific factory labor conditions
in China indicates a basic philosophical stance that may lead to efforts to change
national labor laws rather than assisting the companies who contract with her
firn in enforcing them.
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The firm chosen by the litigants to audit factories in
Saipan, although respected by the garment industry,' exists
largely without competition other than the quality assurance
departments of industry licensees. This situation may lend
itself to the imposition of that firm's personal philosophy of
labor policy on the daily concerns of the management of these
factories, rather than its reliance on the wisdom of the nation-
al legislatures and labor agencies (and their inherent consider-
ation of social issues particular to their regions) in formulating
labor policies that are compatible with the people who are
subject to them. Ultimately, the continued success of indepen-
dent monitoring may depend upon the creation of competing
firms that, through competition, can push each other towards
objective resolutions of sweatshop conditions rather than pres-
suring licensors and licensee factories into specific philosophi-
cal policy decisions.'65 This is not to say that licensor re-
sponses to violations need always be deferential to the host
state's labor laws. One of the remarkable.attributes of indepen-
dent monitoring programs is how they provoke change in a
state's laws, the enforcement thereof, and the general attitude
of a state's government towards the perception of their actions
(or inaction) with regards to human rights held by the consum-
ing public. 66
In response to the heightened attention paid to substan-
dard factory condItions within its borders and in the global
market, the Indian government has taken steps towards im-
proving its record on labor abuses. 7 In 1998, the Indian gov-
ernment renewed its agreement with the ILO's International
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and has acted
to aggressively remove children from the the workforce.' 8
Additionally, the number of NGO's working in India to solve
the child labor problem has risen from seven in 1990 to over
700 in 1999.9 To alleviate the economic hardship families
endure when a child is removed from his or her job, the Indian
government is now obliged to pay a significant subsidy to such
164. See Collier, supra note 139.
165. See supra text accompanying note 163.
166. See All About Independent Monitoring, Clean Clothes, at http//www.clean-
clothes.org/1/monitorl.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2000).
167. See Tackling Abuses, supra note 74.
168. See id.
169. Id.
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families if alternative employment cannot be found for an
adult in that child's family.170 The law imposes significant
fines against employers who violate the 1986 Child Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act and uses the money to fi-
nance that child's education. 7' This is a small, but identifi-
able step towards universal primary education, which "helps
keep children out of the workforce." 72
V. CONCLUSION
F.A. Hayek wrote that the "fundamental principle that in
the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as
possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as
little as possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of
applications."7 ' The treatment of sweatshops in the global
marketplace bears this out. What began in response to "a pub-
lie relations nightmare"74 has turned into an effective solu-
tion for an issue that legal systems, both national and interna-
tional, have failed to confront definitively. The market, having
created the problem, can eradicate sweatshops by rendering
this practice unprofitable. The western clothing retailers and
designers who have sought out the cost-saving benefits of pro-
ducing their goods in the developing world have the power to
withhold their business from scofflaw factory operators. In
response to the market's reaction to this issue, governments
and international regimes are now improving their enforce-
ment mechanisms to provide relief for workers laboring under
sweatshop conditions, lest these governments be perceived as
unresponsive. Perhaps in cooperation with these national and
local governments, corporations can effect systemic change that
will improve factory conditions generally by raising the overall
factory condition standards and the expectations of their col-
leagues and competitors. Additionally, the efforts by garment
manufacturers to unify their enforcement/monitoring programs
marks a departure from the belief that private industries
should take their behavioral cues from the legal system and
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 21 (1994).
174. Shawn Meadows, Will Saipan Legal Battle Stretch the Limits of Liability?,
BOBBIN, May 1, 1999, at 16.
2001] 1145
1146 BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXVI:3
points towards a self-governing system where market forces
speak sufficiently loud to bring about much-needed change in
the lives of garment factory workers.
